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Exploring the WFO Option for 
Global Banking Regulation
lawrence G baxter*
1.   INTRODUCTION
Globalisation promised worldwide development and wealth — and 
threatened new possibilities for harm. the promises and the threats were 
realised equally within the short time-frame of the first decade of the 
21st century. riding on the great glasnost brought about by the World 
trade organization (Wto) and the liberalisation of financial markets in 
many areas of the world, international trade and international finance 
accelerated at an impressive pace.1 so too did the frequency and scale of 
systemic financial crises around the world.2
the 2008 crash that had been waiting for a place to happen was trig-
gered by the subprime mortgage crisis in the united states and eventu-
ally culminated in the Great recession—the second longest american 
recession of the 20th century.3 this recession impaired us GdP by 
4.1%, wiped out 7.3 million jobs and reduced the average net worth 
of americans by 21%. of course the impact swiftly went global. the 
 1 
 * i am grateful to my colleague, larry Helfer, for his very helpful suggestions on the 
revised draft.
on which see generally, for example, laurence boulle The Law Of Globalisation: An 
Introduction (2009), especially ch 5; douglas d evanoff, david s Hoelscher & George 
Kaufman Globalisation And Systemic Risk (2009).
 2 see Michael bordo, barry eichengreen, daniela Kilingebiel & Maria soledad 
Martinez-Peria ‘is the crisis Problem Growing More severe?’ (2001) 16:32 Ecomomic 
Policy 51 (World bank paper version, december 2000, available at http://sitere-
sources.worldbank.org/dec/resources/cris_problem_more_severe.pdf). see gener-
ally carmen M reinhart & Kenneth s rogoff This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries 
Of Financial Folly (2009).
 3 national bureau of economic research, available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/
sept2010.html. see the graphic accompanying the article by sara Murray ‘slump 




demise of lehman brothers on 15 september 2008 instantly triggered 
the Global Financial crisis (GFc), with reverberations from the bank-
ruptcy displaying themselves in many countries and freezing the global 
supply of credit.4
the world continues to experience the dire consequences of border-
less trade and finance, a gigantic market that is inadequately moderated 
by mechanisms for controlling the contagion that spreads from financial 
meltdowns anywhere in the international system. this has left the inter-
national community with the perplexing challenge of devising forms of 
regulation and governance that might ensure that the benefits of globali-
sation come at less severe cost to financial stability.
2.   SUPRANATIONAL REGULATOR?
a solution long proposed is to create supranational or global regula-
tory agencies for supervising international financial institutions.5 such 
proposals, though sometimes still strongly offered and even supported 
by some senior political leaders, seem to have no chance of success.6 
economic regulation, particularly as it relates to banking, is a function 
so close to the heart of the political sovereignty of any nation that it 
seems almost unimaginable that any country, let alone major groups of 
nations, would cede so much power to a transnational body — at least 
not without decades of tortuous negotiations, corresponding uncertainty 
and regulatory paralysis. europe itself has struggled to reach agreement 
on supranational financial regulation and has had to settle for groupings 
 4 see, for example, carrick Mollenkamp, Mark Whitehouse, John Hilsenrath & 
ianthe Jeanne dugan ‘lehman’s demise triggered cash crunch around Globe’ 
Wall St Journal 29 september 2008, available at http://professional.wsj.com/article/
sb122266132599384845.html?mg=reno-secaucus-wsj. this view of what happened 
is partially challenged in a study by Gara afonso, anna Kovner & antionette 
schoar, ‘What happened to us interbank lending in the financial crisis?’ Vox, 26 
apirl 2010, available at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4941.
 5 Former british Prime Minister Gordon brown, in his earlier capacity of chairman 
of the international Monetary Fund ministerial steering committee, proposed a 
World Financial authority. see Howard davies & david Green Global Financial 
Regulation: The Essential Guide (2008) 112. see also the authors noted by lawrence 
G baxter ‘internationalisation of law—the ‘complex’ case of bank regulation’ 
in Mary Hiscock and William van caenegem (eds) The Internationalisation of Law: 
Legislating, Decision-Making, Practice and Education (2010) 3 at 21–22, notes 154–159, 
and luigi spaventa, ‘reforms of the World Financial system: can the G20 deliver?’, 
vox, 28 January 2009, available at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2894.
 6 Heidi Mandanis schooner and Michael W taylor Global Bank Regulation: Principles 
and Policies (2010) 292 (‘a global financial regulator would, however, appear to be 
beyond the realm of practical politics’).
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of bureaucracy that lack the power to take significant direct action and 
are dependent on networks of domestic regulators.7
3.   A NEW WFO?
barry eichengreen,8 Peter boone and simon Johnson9 — prominent 
international economists — have headed in another direction, resorting 
to a more traditional international law approach. they propose, instead 
of a supranational regulator, a new global trade in finance treaty, 
what Professor eichengreen has proposed calling a World Financial 
organization (WFo), and similar perhaps to the current World trade 
organization.10 Professors boone and Johnson rather vaguely return, 
however, to the global regulator theme for enforcing such a treaty:
it would also need to have a body that monitored implementation, similar 
to the iMF [international Monetary Fund] or bis [bank for international 
settlements] today. this body would also need to have clear rights to impose 
new regulations so that rules can be modified to reflect changes in problems.11 
at present some of the conditions for entry into foreign financial markets 
are already addressed by the annex on Financial services to the General 
agreement on trade in services (Gats)12 and, regionally, by numerous 
treaties such as chapter 14 of the north american Free trade agreement 
(naFta).13 these treaties do not, however, address in significantly action-
able detail the minimum standards for bank capitalisation, liquidity, risk 
management, regulatory supervision and other ingredients essential for 
preventing or at least forestalling unsafe banking.14 Presumably the WFo 
 7 For the newest developments as adopted by the european commission, see the 






 8 barry eichengreen ‘not a new bretton Woods but a new bretton Woods Process’ in 
barry eichengreen & richard baldwin (eds) What G20 Leaders Must Do To Stabilize 
Our Economy and Fix the Financial System (2008) 25, available at http://www.voxeu.
org/reports/G20_summit.pdf.
 9 Peter boone and simon Johnson ‘Will the politics of global moral hazard sink us 
again?’ in adair turner et al The Future of Finance (2010) 247 at 269. For some his-
torical context see, for example, schooner and taylor, note 6 above at 292–94.
 10 see http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm.
 11 boone and Johnson, note 9 above at 269.
 12 see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/10-anfin_e.htm.
 13 see http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343&mtpiid=145.
 14 indeed, the Gats and associated documents (Financial annex, Market access rules 
and the additional understanding on commitments in Financial services) may 
prevent necessary action to avert crises and might already have been widely violated 
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proposal would envisage more detailed standards as minimum condi-
tions for mutual recognition and enforcement, and that an adjudicatory 
body similar to the appellate body of the Wto would be established 
to arbitrate disputes. indeed, in a more recent exploration of the WFo 
option, Professor eichengreen proposes the creation of independent 
panels of experts for determining whether countries are in compliance 
with their obligations as members of the new organisation; if there is a 
finding of non-compliance then financial institutions chartered in the 
offending territory would find themselves restricted in their ability to do 
business in other member nations.15
4.   WHy THE WFO OPTION IS NOT VIABLE
the WFo idea is superficially appealing because it might obviate the 
need for a (politically unrealistic) supranational regulator while also 
promoting the efficient flow of finance across borders on the basis of 
minimum safety standards. in my view it is misconceived, doomed 
to failure and, even if i were wrong, would not be the most effective 
approach to global financial services for the future.16
the WFo option misconceives the nature of the problem. unlike 
trade regulation, financial regulation deals only in part with specific 
products, activities and services. Financial and particularly bank regula-
tors must concern themselves with the ongoing conduct of specific finan-
cial institutions and, more recently, with how their conduct impacts 
overall financial stability. Prudential standards must be interpreted and 
applied dynamically, on a daily basis, and within highly situational con-
texts in which, for example, capital levels or leverage ratios in one month 
might be acceptable but, in light of sudden losses or systemic instability, 
might be unacceptable in another. the list of variable circumstances and 
discretionary considerations applicable to a particular financial insti-
tution, group of institutions, or entire domestic or global industry (for 
example, commercial lending) is perhaps infinite in its range. this is a 
far cry from and much more nuanced a context than that which obtains 
by government actions to address the GFc. see for example, bart de Meester ‘the 
Global Financial crisis and Government support for banks: What role for the 
Gats?’ (2010) 13 J Int Econ L 27; Jayati Ghosh ‘the Wto as barrier to Financial 
regulation’ IDEA, 8 February 2010, available at http://www.networkideas.org/
featart/feb2010/fa8_Wto.htm).
 15 barry eichengreen ‘international financial regulation after the crisis’(2010) Daedelus 
107, 113–14.
 16 see also chris brummer ‘How international Financial law Works (and How it 
doesn’t)’ (2011) 99 Georgetown L J available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1542829 (discussing the impracticality of a global financial 
regulator).
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in the trade of specific goods, quotas, tariffs, and the like. so the whole 
enterprise of financial regulation is quite different from trade regulation, 
and attempts to use the same or similar model would merely create a 
mismatch of tools and problems.
secondly, as far as practicality is concerned, another potentially fatal 
problem is that such an agreement would surely take a decade or more to 
secure.17 Major transnational systemic financial crises are already occur-
ring at a more frequent rate and their scale might well be on the rise.18 
as one commentator recently observed, ‘We could very well have one 
or two more crises before these rules even come into play.’19 We cannot 
afford to wait while a whole new treaty is negotiated. and even if such a 
treaty were to be negotiated, trade disputes usually take years to resolve 
and the delays seldom generate large-scale crises. Financial crises, on the 
other hand, develop and must be responded to overnight.
thirdly, the Wto was designed primarily to open up markets rather 
than regulate their ongoing operations. this means that sanctions are 
easier to apply: membership itself is a powerful and prestigious carrot at 
the national level, and nationally focused trade sanctions for non-com-
pliance a powerful deterrent. in effect, treaties such as the Wto create 
what larry Helfer has described as ‘club goods,’ which can be enjoyed 
by members of the ‘club’ but excluded from non-members.20 on the 
other hand, excluding specific financial institutions that refuse to meet 
the requirements of any analogue to the Gats, for example exclusion 
from the WFo, would seriously risk generating more dangerous offshore 
financial centres (oFcs). Money, unlike goods and many other services, 
is fungible and more easily disguised, laundered and converted than tan-
gible goods, and its flow is not easily containable. even the most prestig-
ious of financial institutions have threatened to thwart stricter regula-
tion by departing for more friendly jurisdictions.21 though such threats 
 17 the current Wto trade negotiation round, the doha development agenda, has 
itself been under negotiation for more than nine years, yet despite an asserted 
‘wide-spread and determined commitment,’ shows no signs of coming to closure. 
see http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/tnc_dg_stat_19oct10_e.htm.
 18 see note 2, above.
 19 bernard baumohl, chief economist of the economic outlook Group, quoted by 
Joel schectman, ‘new bank rules May not Prevent More Meltdowns’ Newsweek, 
16 september 2010, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09/16/new-bank-
rules-may-not-prevent-more-meltdowns.html.
 20 laurence r Helfer ‘nonconsensual international lawmaking’ 2008 University of 
Illinois L Rev 71, 100–103.
 21 these threats have been common lately. see, for example, the threats by british banks 
to relocate their headquarters if they were to face breakup in britain: Jon Menon & 
andrew Macaskill, ‘banks likely to escape breakup by uK commission’, Bloomberg, 
23 september 2010 available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-23/u-k-
banks-likely-to-escape-breakup-by-government-commission-analysts-say.html; 
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are probably mostly bluff, they do have considerable domestic political 
influence. Furthermore, if these threats were ever carried out, the tech-
nology revolution has driven financial innovation to new heights in 
which thinly-policed offshore schemes could rapidly infiltrate back into 
domestic systems and, through the capillaries of international finance, 
could quickly spread contagion across supposed financial ‘boundaries.’ 
to continue the Helfer metaphor, non-members (that is nations and 
financial institutions that can evade the rules of the club) can still secure 
the benefits of transborder operations and, in the process, generate nega-
tive externalities for everyone.
Finally, if formal international solutions are to be pursued, it should 
at least be asked whether, as a long-term solution, amendment of the 
Gats to take into account the need for emergency action and better 
macro- and micro-prudential regulation might be more expedient than 
pursuing yet another major international treaty. should one vest broader 
arbitral power within the existing Wto institutions to address bad faith 
regulatory actions? creating a whole new, ultimately competing, WFo 
would seem to be a palpably less efficient, if not entirely duplicative, 
approach in a world of global trade that is always facilitated by and runs 
on the rails of international finance. at the same time, as is evident from 
discussions concerning the merits of extending the Wto to incorporate 
broader issues such as labour standards and environmental protection, 
even this option is problematic.22
5.   STARTING AT HOME?
there is a tendency to confuse different types of crisis. the GFc was 
not an example of the sovereign default, political, currency, inflation 
or debt crises that have driven many other regional and international 
crises.23 it was a banking crisis, triggered by an asset bubble and market 
and regulatory failure that went global because of the globalised nature of 
the modern financial system. this implies that it was the agents of market 
activity that drove the build-up to the crisis and transmitted its global 
consequences.
if this view is correct, then it would seem to be more effective to 
continue to focus on the primary industry and regulatory structure at 
the domestic level before attempting to create a major new international 
framework. the sources of global financial instability and bank fragility 
and by the ceo of Goldman sachs to europe: Patrick Jenkins & Megan Murphy 
‘Goldman warns europe on regulation’ Financial Times, 29 september 2010, avail-
able at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/793cb220-cbf2-11df-bd28-00144feab49a.html.
 22 see, for example, andrew r Guzman ‘Global governance and the Wto’ (2004) 45 
Harv Int’l L J 303.
 23 see generally reinhart and rogoff, note 2 above, 4–14.
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really still reside and need to be resolved first at the domestic level. 
notwithstanding wide-scale international collaboration in forums such 
as the G-20, iMF and bank for international settlements, some of which 
will be discussed later, domestic jurisdictions still have much structural 
revision to do before we will see meaningful regulatory progress at a 
transnational level.
to try to resolve the problems through new global institutions would 
involve having the industry drive the framework rather than the other 
way around: a very fat tail wagging a very undernourished dog. a global 
framework developed now would merely serve to validate and accom-
modate the aggressive demands of a competitive and already global 
banking industry that is not focused on the externalities generated by 
these activities. the last time we engaged in such an approach to major 
restructuring was when the travelers’ Group and citicorp presented 
regulators with a de facto merger that forced the passage of the Gramm-
leach-bliley act of 1999 in the united states — with disastrous results.24
Pursuing yet another arduous and complicated treaty would create a 
diversion from the difficult task of economic and industry reform. unless 
and until nations have the fortitude to address the fact that without 
massive public backing subsidies the very large, complex and global 
financial institutions (lcFis) would likely be insolvent, and that for as 
long as they operate on their current complexity and scale they pose vast 
risks to financial systems as a whole, we will continue to promote the 
escalation of global risk rather than diminish it.25 no amount of inter-
national agreement that refuses to acknowledge this basic problem will 
insulate us from another, rapidly globalised, financial crisis.
so domestic jurisdictions may have little alternative in the face of new 
crises but to adopt, as we often have,26 unilateral measures to prevent or at 
least reduce or minimise the impact of unsafe foreign financial practices 
within their own systems. as Joseph stiglitz has observed, ‘Watchdogs 
 24 not only did the travelers/citi merger itself fall apart a few years later but the 
Gramm-leach-bliley act is blamed by many for precipitating dangerous bank com-
binations that contributed to the GFc.
 25 For my own views, see lawrence G baxter ‘did we tame the beast? views on the us 
Financial reform bill’ (2010) ii J Regulation & Risk North Asia 209. Many others have 
expressed similar concerns.
 26 the united states examples are the international banking act of 1978 (gov-
erning licensing of foreign bank operations in the us); Foreign bank supervision 
enhancement act of 1991 (enacted in response to the bcci debacle and setting 
standards of consolidated and home country supervision expected by the us of 
foreign banking organisations operating in the us); and scattered provisions in 
the recent dodd-Frank Wall street reform and consumer Protection act of 2010 
(subjecting us operations of foreign banks, inter alia, to potential financial stability 
regulation).
Globalisation and Governance120
need not bark together’.27 to be sure, such action would be all the more 
effective if also coordinated at the international level. but we should not 
be lulled by such coordination efforts into neglecting the critical areas in 
which our own domestic responses to global finance might be improved.
6.   WHAT ARE THE DOMESTIC AREAS REqUIRING GREATER 
FOCUS?
(a)   Industry scale, scope and complexity
the most fundamental challenge is to devise the proper size and scope 
of financial institutions for optimal safe operation, given the complexity 
of their risks and the capacity for their meaningful regulation. this chal-
lenge was posed but ultimately avoided in the united states, even though 
many senior policy-makers, regulators and commentators believe that it 
must ultimately be addressed. the independent banking commission 
(icb) has raised it again in the united Kingdom and the icb is to be con-
gratulated for having the courage to renew such basic questions in the 
face of vigorous industry opposition.28
the global economy, as much as domestic economies, is very vul-
nerable to the collapse of another gargantuan financial institution. can 
we really afford the risk of $2–3 trillion, highly complex (and relatively 
inefficient) lcFis without adequate assurances that they can be safely 
managed and regulated? such assurances are not to be found beyond the 
realm of mere assertion. like all fundamental reform, it is unlikely that 
this challenge will be met before another crisis creates the political will 
to do so.
(b)   Continued development of better general intelligence 
gathering, analysis and detection of global hot spots of 
dependency
the complete failure to detect the growing dependence of the larger 
financial system upon the credit default swap market, led primarily by 
aiG, provides an example.29 such trends are reported and easily moni-
tored; yet action came far too late. similarly, the dangerous growth in 
 27 Joseph stiglitz ‘Watchdogs need not bark together’ Financial Times, 9 February 2010, 
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3ebddd1e-15b7-11df-ad7e-00144feab49a.
html#axzz1cyZzikrc.
 28 see independent commission on banking ‘issues Paper: call for evidence’ 24 
september 2010 available at http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk/bank-
ingcommission/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/issues-Paper-24-september-2010.pdf.
 29 the final word on the aiG affair is not yet out, but a convenient collection of testi-
mony, charts and graphs is to be found in the record of the Financial crisis inquiry 
commission for its hearing into the role of derivatives in the Financial crisis, avail-
able at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/06-30-2010.php#documents.
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leverage among international investment banks, in particular, and the 
rapid decline in bank capital necessary to meet the misconstrued stand-
ards of basel ii, could and should have become a central concern of 
domestic regulators long before it did. How do we adapt to the reactions 
of industry when new regulations are imposed? the progress and effec-
tiveness of new institutions such as the us Financial stability oversight 
council and the new european systemic risk board should be observed 
before we try to create even grander (and indubitably more cumbersome) 
bureaucracies.
economists and lawyers also have much work to do to get with the 
program and move beyond formal doctrine and models to a better under-
standing of system dynamics. in the case of the lawyers, thomas cottier 
has rightly observed, international economic law practitioners have ‘left 
the monetary part of the equation largely outside their radar screen and 
field of interest,’ and in the process have become ‘virtually without voice 
in the aftermath of the banking crisis.’30
(c)   Rapid domestic response plans that enable LCIFs and 
regulators to trigger circuit breakers as crises begin to erupt 
in other domestic economies
this task involves developing a different approach to regulation from the 
traditional one of command and control. regulators are and always will 
be embroiled within a rapidly innovating, evolving and labile complex 
adaptive system that requires systems thinking.31 this thinking might 
entail the adoption of principles such as modularity.32
i realise that these suggestions take us into treacherous and contro-
versial waters that might permit domestic regulators to apply various 
principles from ring-fencing33 to uncoordinated local receiverships in 
order to prevent or retard the spread of financial contagion.34 they risk 
reviving requirements, disliked by lcFis, such as local subsidiary forma-
tion and liquidity requirements as necessary elements of safe entry into 
 30 thomas cottier ‘challenges ahead in international economic law’ (2009) 12 J Int 
Econ L 3 at 8.
 31 see, for example, baxter, note 5 above passim, and baxter, note 25 above at 217.
 32 see, for example, andrew G Haldane ‘regulation or prohibition: the $100 billion 
question’ (2010) ii J Regulation & Risk North Asia 101, 110 and following.
 33 see, for example, schooner and taylor, note 6 above, 255.
 34 the united nations commission on international trade law’s Model law on cross-
border insolvency (1997) art 13(1), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/
en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html, which does not necessarily apply 
to financial institution insolvency regimes, would prohibit such an approach. For 
general discussion, see douglas W arner & Joseph J norton ‘building a Framework 
to address Failure of complex Global Financial institutions’ (2009) 39 Hong Kong L 
J 95, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1374126).
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domestic markets. issues of fairness to creditors and customers also arise. 
yet greater regulatory focus on the deployment by financial institutions 
of other internal circuit-breakers could also be a necessary, albeit unwel-
come, element to the kind of rapid response, or sense-and-respond regu-
lation, that i suspect will shape the future of global financial regulation.35
(d)   Tougher, closely supervised infrastructural conduits for 
regulating the flow of financial transactions — building 
robustness into financial market utilities (FMUs)36 
While it is not always possible to force private and ‘offshore’ pools 
of capital to channel their transactions and clearing through such 
exchanges, the stronger and more visible these exchanges become the 
easier will it be to isolate, and identify for what they are, the potentially 
dangerous activities of such operators and to impose domestic limita-
tions on financial institutions that do business with them. Maverick oFc 
ventures might thereby be more easily exposed to higher risk-pricing on 
their activities and capital.
7.   RISKS OF PROTECTIONISM?
in promoting the idea of further domestic activity we must avoid a return 
to pure protectionism, which is all too tempting given the superior eco-
nomic power of the nations most impacted by the GFc.37 developing 
domestic responses always run this risk. but unilateral action, con-
ducted in concert with close international engagement and consultation 
along the lines presently offered by the G-20, Fsb and basel committee, 
need not be protectionist any more than taking personal responsibility 
for securing one’s home need be regarded as an act hostile to one’s 
neighbours.
 35 the basel committee has issued a thoughtful final report, report and 
recommendations of the cross-border bank resolution Group (March 2010), avail-
able at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf.
 36 in the united states the dodd-Frank act, note 26 above, institutes a new regu-
latory regime for FMus: see title viii (‘the Payment, clearing, and settlement 
supervision act of 2010, §§ 801 and following). see generally anna l Paulson & 
Kirstin e Wells, ‘enhancing financial stability: the case of financial market utili-
ties’ 279 Chicago Fed Letter, october 2010, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/
digital_assets/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2010/cfloctober2010_279.pdf.
 37 consider anne van aaken & Jürgen Kurtz ‘Prudence or discrimination? emergency 
Measures, the Global Financial crisis and international economic law’ (2009)12 J 
Int Econ L 859; eilis Ferran Capital Market Openness After Financial Turmoil, Working 
Paper, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1436143.
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8.   INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION
international coordination has become much more sophisticated in 
recent years and is clearly essential. anne-Marie slaughter and others 
have emphasised the significance of the modern evolution of transna-
tional regulatory networks (trns).38 these organisations include the 
basel committee,39 created by central bankers under the auspices of the 
bank for international settlements, and the Financial stability board,40 
created by the G-20 out of the G-8’s former Financial stability Forum. 
such organisations facilitate negotiations and international agreements 
on minimum standards of capital and governance of internationally 
active banks and the bases for cooperation and rapid exchange of super-
visory information between domestic financial regulators. a promi-
nent example was provided in november 2010 when the G-20 summit 
in seoul, south Korea, approved the basel iii proposals41 on minimum 
capital levels and other bank regulatory mechanisms.42
slaughter and her followers celebrate analogous preceding develop-
ments as solutions to the ‘global paradox’: ‘[w]e need more government 
on a global or regional scale, but we don’t want the centralization of 
decision-making power and coercive authority so far from the people 
actually to be governed’.43 trns, it is argued, provide the solution since 
they enable complex decisions to be delegated to bureaucrats and techno-
crats who are themselves ultimately politically accountable to domestic 
institutions because their decisions still require the internal sanction of 
such institutions.44
although slaughter’s premises are somewhat controversial,45 the trn 
model has provided, and does provide, a means by which excep tionally 
 38 anne-Marie slaughter A New World Order (2004). For the progenitor of this work, 
see robert Keohane ‘the analysis of international regimes: towards a european-
american research Programme’ in volker rittberger and Peter Mayer (eds) Regime 
Theory and International Relations (1995) 23.
 39 basel committee on banking supervision, available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/
index.htm.
 40 see http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/.
 41 see http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm.
 42 see the G-20 summit declaration, 11–12 nov, available at http://www.g20.org/
pub_communiques.aspx. 
 43 ibid at 8.
 44 it might now be argued that the provisions in the so-called ‘collins amendment’ 
contained in the dodd-Frank act, note 26 above, §§ 171 and 175, which require 
regulators to set leverage and risk-based capital requirements and engage in inter-
national policy coordination, effectively provide legal and democratically account-
able endorsement of the basel and Fsb processes.
 45 see, for example, Pierre-Hugues verdier ‘transnational regulatory networks and their 
limits’ (2009) 34 Yale J Int L 113; Kenneth anderson ‘squaring the circle? reconciling 
sovereignty and Global Governance through Global Government networks (review 
of anne-Marie slaughter, a new World order)’ (2005) 118 Harv L Rev 1255.
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complex and complicated regulatory issues requiring international coor-
dination are being addressed. despite the fact that their work failed 
utterly to prevent the GFc, the causes really began at home not in basel, 
and were globalised as a result of the global nature of our financial institu-
tions. We should be careful not to dismiss or diminish the importance of 
and significant progress made by trns as a more practical means of pro-
moting global coordination and stability than any future global treaty, 
particularly once we have had the courage first to solve more satisfac-
torily the underlying domestic problems relating to financial industry 
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vPreface
the Mandela institute at the school of law in the university of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, was established to develop knowledge 
and capacity relevant to the involvement of south africa, the region and 
the continent of africa in the competitive global economy. the institute 
conducts short courses, continuing professional development courses, 
workshops and seminars for government, industry, the professions and 
community organisations. 
the institute also conducts public conferences on subjects within its 
brief. For the last five years it has run an annual competition law confer-
ence, in conjunction with the south african competition commission. 
a few years ago it held a conference on international trade and 
development in africa and at the time of writing is organising the first 
africa-wide conference on international economic law, in conjunction 
with the society of international economic law (siel) and the World 
trade institute.
in september 2010 lawyers and economists, government, industry 
and the professions, and community organisations and nGos partici-
pated in a conference on Globalisation and Governance. a selection of 
the articles based on conference papers has been chosen for this book 
to reflect diversity in the topic, from high theory to raw practicality. an 
attempt has been made to include contributions from different discipli-
nary perspectives, different jurisdictions and different levels of profes-
sional status.
acknowledgment and thanks are due to the principal sponsors of the 
conference on which this book is based, the Konrad adenauer stiftung 
and in particular dr Werner böhler and Ms nancy Msibi of the Kas 
Johannesburg office. support was received with gratitude from the swiss 
embassy in Pretoria, the World trade institute in bern, Juta Publishers in 
cape town and Webber Wentzel attorneys in Johannesburg. thanks are 
also extended to the research office and Faculty of commerce, law and 
Management at Wits university for their support.
i should like to thank my colleagues at the Mandela institute for their 
assistance with the conference and support for this book. this goes firstly 
to Julie dunsford, organiser extraordinaire, to Michelle scorgie-Gallant, 
irma cheval, nokuhle Madolo and Magda Janse van noordwyk, and to 
Palissy Kengne and neo Phetoane. Particular thanks go to Henry Gotosa 
and azwimpheleli langalanga, interns in the institute, for patiently 
assisting with editing, checking and otherwise bringing the manuscript 
to readiness.
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outside the institute thanks go to Jonathan Klaaren, acting Head of 
school, and Kathy Munro, acting dean of the Faculty, for their support, 
and to loyiso nongxa, vice-chancellor, at Wits for lending various kinds 
of support to the conference. it has been a good experience to collaborate 
again with simon sephton from siber ink and have him commit to also 
producing an e-version of this book. 
Where it has been feasible contributors have taken account of events 
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